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Introduction
The coffee tree was introduced into Vietnam by the French during the 1850s. Production,
however, was relatively insignificant until after re-unification in 1975, when the policy of
constructing “new economic zones” resulted in migration from the densely populated
northern and coastal areas to the central highlands whose soil and climate conditions are
suitable for coffee-growing. Even so, production remained fairly stagnant until the start of
doi moi in 1986 (for analyses on agricultural reforms during doi moi, see Che, Kompas
and Vousden 2000,  Leung and Riedel 2001). Since 1986, the production of coffee, like
that of rice, has grown dramatically, making Vietnam the fourth largest exporter of coffee
in the world in 1998 (about 6.5% of the world total), after Brazil and Columbia (about
18% and 13% respectively), and almost on a par with Indonesia. As Vietnamese and
Indonesian coffee exports are mainly the Robusta varieties which are lower priced than
the Arabica varieties, the share of world export by value is about 3.4 to 4% for Vietnam
and Indonesia, compared with 21% for Brazil and 17% for Columbia. (See Anh 1999,
pp.85-6).1 Coffee exports currently account for some 12% of Vietnam’s total export
values, second only to that of rice exports.
Coffee trees are highly vulnerable to frost and shortage of rainfall which significantly
increase the incidence of infectious diseases that can wipe out entire plantations. As new
trees take about three to five years before they are productive, coffee production is subject
to large supply shocks. As a result, world coffee prices are highly volatile, with cycles of
boom and bust being sustained over half a decade or longer. Figure 1a shows coffee
prices on the New York coffee exchange for the three decades between 1970 and 1999.
One measure of price volatility, the coefficient of variation, shows a variability of some
45% in prices from year to year. Even the variability within each year (the intra-year
                                                                
1 A UNDP survey conducted in 1998 shows that the cultivation area of arabica in Vietnam occupied only
5% of the total (Minot 1998). Subsequent attempts to plant a hybrid strain of arabica and wild coffee from
Timor were unsuccessful due to a number of reasons including insufficient initial capital investment,
inadequate primary processing, and resistance on the part of small subsistence growers (Anh 1999, p.68)
2variation) shows an average of 13.5%. Figure 1b shows the Robusta coffee prices quoted
on the London market from 1970 to 2000. Again, the co-efficient of variation shows a
very high volatility of 46.6%.
In view of the increasing dependence of Vietnam on coffee exports, the large fluctuations
in world prices have become a serious concern. In the Central Highlands province of Dak
Lak where 60% of Vietnam’s coffee is grown, the coffee crop accounts for over 95% of
the local incomes. Falling coffee prices in recent months and land rights issues associated
with the indigenous peoples of the province have sparked off one of the rare disputes in
the countryside since re-unification (see Reuters March 12). As a result, a number of
measures have been adopted recently by the government, notably a buffer stock scheme
financed through the State Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development. The possibility
of a Coffee Board being established in the near future has also been raised. This paper
analyzes the potential effectiveness of these measures to stabilize coffee prices in
Vietnam, and offers some alternative, more market-based solutions to the problem of
managing coffee price fluctuations.
Section 1 of the paper discusses the structure of Vietnam’s coffee industry, focusing on
the distribution of profits in coffee exports and the share of costs arising from price
fluctuations.  Section 2 canvasses the experience of many developing and developed
countries in the operation of buffer stock schemes, stabilization funds, and international
cartels in the management of commodity price fluctuations. Section 3 discusses
alternative, market-based schemes adopted by some countries, particularly in relation to
coffee, and section 4 draws some conclusions on the prospects for success of the current
measures in Vietnam, and offers suggestions for the development of potentially more
viable schemes.
1. Structure of the coffee industry
Up until 1999, coffee exporting activity in Vietnam was confined to state owned
enterprises (SOEs). Since then, private sector firms have been permitted to engage in the
export of coffee. The structure of the industry as at the end of 1998 was analyzed in some
detail by Nguyen Tu Anh (1999), and is summarized in Figure 2. As the figure indicates,
the bulk (92%) of Vietnam’s coffee production is exported to international markets, and
3between 85 to 90% of planted area is cultivated by small farmers, with the remainder (10
to 15%) cultivated by state- owned farms (of both central and provincial governments).
In the case of the small farmers, after harvesting the coffee cherries, a preliminary
processing step is usually done on the farms, whereby the green coffee bean is extracted
from the shell (hulling). After this, apart from a relatively small quantity that goes into
domestic consumption, the bulk of the green coffee beans is delivered by the farmers to
“assemblers” (or buyers) who, as at the end of 1998, were licensed by state- owned
processors and exporters. The assemblers purchased coffee beans from the small growers
through individual contracts. Export prices were communicated daily by the exporters to
the assemblers who were then able to pass the price fluctuations onto the small growers.
Indeed, given the monopsony position of the assemblers, they were able to keep the farm-
gate prices as a relatively low percentage of export prices whilst passing the risks of price
fluctuations to the small growers (Anh 1999).2 As there does not appear to be a time-
series on farm-gate prices, it is not possible to determine exactly how much of the export
price fluctuations were borne by the growers. However, the monopsonist position of the
assemblers, the individual contracts with small growers, together with the fact that
assemblers were quoted export prices everyday, would indicate that most, if not all, the
fluctuations in export prices would have been passed onto the small growers.
After the assemblers deliver the coffee beans to the processors, a further processing step
takes place whereby the green coffee beans are cleaned, sorted and graded, ready for
export. Although both private (including some foreign-invested) processors and state
owned processors were in the market, the relative size of the private processors was quite
small. This is to be expected as the monopsonist assemblers were licensed exclusively by
the state-owned processors and exporters, and would be expected to deliver most of their
coffee beans to the state enterprises. Furthermore, the production from the state-owned
farms bypassed the assemblers and was delivered directly to the state processors. At the
same time, the state processors and exporters showed little profit margin (less than 0.9%
in 1997, Anh 1999 p.53), while the bulk of the profits from coffee exports was captured
by the state-licensed assemblers (profit margins net of transportation costs of over 40%
were estimated for 1996, Anh 1999 p.53). Therefore, the apparent “cartel” amongst the
                                                                
2 Farm-gate prices in Vietnam in 1996 were about 65% of export prices.
4state exporters, state processors, and the state licensed assemblers resulted in relatively
little revenue going to the state or to the small growers, with the latter bearing most, if not
all, the risks involved in international fluctuations of coffee prices.
Since 1999, private firms have been permitted to engage in coffee exports. A recent
estimate puts the share of export earnings by private firms at about 30 to 40% of total
coffee export revenue (Chairman, Vietnam Coffee Association, VICOFA). This is a
significant share, and could have undermined, to some extent, the state-owned and state-
licensed cartel that was in existence prior to the liberalization of export marketing
channels. Indeed, VINACAFE, the largest SOE in the industry, claims that there are
currently over 80 organizations (both government and private) involved in the collection
and export of coffee. This is seen by VINACAFE as being too many for the purposes of
“quality control”, and the establishment of a Coffee Board is proposed. Although the
structure of the market is currently rather “fluid” (Figure 3 maps the current
developments), it does appear that liberalization of export marketing has impacted
negatively on the cartel of licensed assemblers/state processors/state exporters, and the
Coffee Board proposal is seen to be an attempt to redress the balance. It is, however,
unclear as to the impact of the recent liberalization on the small growers. To the extent
that there are now some “truly” private assemblers, and that there exists competition
between these and the “state-licensed” assemblers, for any given export price for coffee,
farm gate prices should be a higher percentage of export prices than the situation without
competition. However, unless the assemblers were prepared to make a certain fixed, non-
refundable first payment to the small farmers (as in the case of Costa Rica ), the risks of
international price fluctuations would still be assumed completely by the growers.
In response to the downturn in world coffee prices in the past 12 months, the Vietnamese
government initiated a stockpile of 90,000 tonnes of Robusta coffee beans, in addition to
the 60,000 tonnes already in store as at mid-February, 2001. The interest and storage
costs of this buffer stock were supported by an Export Supporting Fund financed largely
through the Vietnam Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (Dow Jones
Newswires 20/3/01). World coffee prices, however, continued to fall in spite of having
reached the targeted stockpile, indicating that Vietnam probably does not have monopoly
power in the world market for Robusta coffee. Even if it has, all that such a scheme
would do is to keep world prices higher than would otherwise be the case, with Vietnam
5bearing all the costs, whilst other Robusta coffee exporting countries share in the benefits
of higher world prices. Furthermore, as there is little information on the prices at which
the assemblers were purchasing coffee into the stockpile, exactly how the scheme
impacted on the small growers is unclear. A more direct and effective method of income
support to small growers would have been simply to pay the growers rather than to spend
public funds in a coffee stockpile. An estimate by the Ministry of Trade put the losses
incurred by state-owned exporters as a result of the stockpile to be US $15.45 million
(Reuters 7/5/01). Subsequently, in July 2001, the stockpiling policy was apparently
abandoned, with exporters permitted to sell freely at market prices.
2. Reducing price variability
There are generally three broad objectives for government interventions in commodity
markets:
1. To make the price distribution over time less variable;
2. To make commodity prices and/or revenues more predictable, for any given price
distribution;
3.  To smooth expenditures, given fluctuations in revenue associated with price
variability.
The third objective is usually achieved through the credit markets and savings decisions,
and will not be dealt with in this paper. The first two objectives are discussed in this
section and the next respectively.
Commodity price stabilization may be carried out domestically via a stabilization fund,
sometimes accompanied by a marketing board and/or state trading enterprises. Except in
the rare circumstances where the country has monopoly power in the world market, it
makes no sense at all for an individual country to run a buffer stock scheme. Even where
the country may have such monopoly power as Australia in the wool market (see Box 1 in
appendix A), the benefits accrue to the producers in the rest of the world who receive
higher prices at no extra cost to themselves. Internationally, price stabilization has been
attempted via international commodity agreements administered through export quotas,
buffer funds and buffer stocks.
6 A domestic stabilization fund compensates producers when prices fall below a pre-
determined floor or price band, and accumulates reserves when prices increase above the
fixed price or band. It is clear that the system is workable only if there is no persistent
tendency for prices to move in only one direction; that is, prices must be able to revert to
their mean.
It has been found empirically (Deaton 1992) that commodity prices do indeed mean-
revert, but only very slowly. Furthermore, commodity price cycles tend to be asymmetric
(Gilbert 1999). This is so because of the interaction between the price-stock cycle and the
investment cycle. When there is a supply or a demand shock to commodities, prices tend
to peak sharply in a tight (limited stocks) market. However, if the market is slack, then
de-cumulation of stocks would tend to make the upward swing in prices more gradual. On
the other hand, accumulation of stocks tends to result in long, flat bottoms. Therefore,
depending on market conditions, commodity price cycles tend to have flat bottoms with
occasional peaks. At the same time, commodities such as ores and tree crops tend to have
long gestation periods. The interaction of the investment cycle and the price-stock cycle
in commodities can result in occasional periods in which prices fall to distressingly low
levels for long periods.
In view of this, buffer stocks and stabilization funds need to be very large, which is very
costly, or the stabilization price band needs to be very wide. Otherwise, they risk running
out of funds very quickly. When these schemes are administered in conjunction with a
marketing board or state trading enterprises, these institutions risk bankruptcy themselves,
as in the case of the Australian Wool Board which tried to raise prices by running a buffer
stock scheme (see Box 1, appendix A). The main problem is that, under these domestic
schemes, the risks of international price fluctuations are transferred from the producers to
the government which often finds it economically (and eventually politically) too costly
to finance the schemes. Moreover, when a buffer fund builds up due to a period of prices
above the stabilization price or upper band, there is a tendency for the government to use
the funds for other purposes, or else to raise the minimum price.
Nor is the problem solved by international cartels imposing export quotas or buffer stocks
on participating countries, usually with a view to raising and stabilizing commodity
prices. The era of the so-called “New International Economic Order” (as evidenced by the
7UNCTAD Resolution 93(IV) and the Brandt Report) called for the “stabilization of
commodity prices at remunerative levels”. However, the asymmetric nature of
commodity price cycles means that schemes set out to stabilize prices about a
supposedly-known trend face intractable problems when the long term relative prices
change. This is evidenced by the failure of several international agreements including the
international sugar agreement (started in 1954/collapsed in 1963), the international tin
agreement (started in 1954/collapsed in 1983 and 1985), the coffee agreement
(commenced in 1962/ suspended in 1989), the cocoa agreement (commenced in 1972/
suspended in 1988), amongst others. Efforts to raise commodity prices (such as in the
spectacular case of OPEC oil and tin) result in inducing consumers to substitute away
from the product. Furthermore, discipline within the cartel is always a problem, and once
prices rise in the short term, some producers are encouraged to breakaway and sell above
their quotas of exports. Vietnam itself benefited from not participating in the international
coffee agreement during the late 1980s.
Apart from price stabilization, domestic marketing boards can perform some useful
functions. They can take advantage of economies of scale for storage, handling, and
marketing of primary commodities. While they do not have enough market power to
influence international prices, they may be in a better position than individual producers
to seek foreign buyers and negotiate contracts, and many are given the monopoly for
exports (as in the case of the Australian Wheat Board). They can perform quality control
and disseminate information on market conditions, technical innovations, and inputs.
Against these benefits is the cost of operating the board which is not profit-driven and
arguably lacks innovative skills. The costs of failure are borne by the producers and
society more generally. Furthermore, technological change has diminished the advantage
of the boards in collecting information and in marketing activities. Moreover, the
monopoly export position given to some of these boards can result in practices that
impact adversely on small growers (as illustrated in section 1 above in the case of the
state monopoly of coffee exports prior to 1999). Finally, many of the functions of a
marketing board can be (and are being) performed by producer co-operatives, such as the
co-operative of coffee growers, FEDECOOP, in Costa Rica. FEDECOOP also performs
very important price hedging functions (see discussion in section 3 below).
8As a result of the repeated failures of domestic and international attempts at stabilizing
commodity prices, efforts are now being made towards setting up schemes that aim at
reducing the uncertainty (but not necessarily the variability) associated with commodity
price fluctuations.
3. Reducing the uncertainty associated with price fluctuations
The main lesson of the failed experiments with commodity price stabilization schemes is
that any attempt to support prices above the equilibrium market price is doomed. Even
price stabilization, as opposed to price support, against a strong and prolonged downturn,
can fail because the scheme becomes too costly. Although some large producers and
consumers are willing to enter into long- term contracts with fixed prices (generally to
ensure continuous supply from a given source), these are not common and remain risky
for the participants.
It is now recognized that producers can be protected from relatively short -term price
fluctuations, generally no more than one crop year. The available financial instruments,
mainly futures and options, are only liquid for the nearby settlement dates (see appendix
C for the mechanics of rolling over futures contracts). Commodity swaps, which are
similar to long- term contracts, are either unavailable or expensive, except where they
involve large producing and consuming entities. This section discusses briefly the
mechanics of using futures and options contracts to reduce uncertainty for commodity
producers, exporters and governments, and the people who will benefit from this
reduction of uncertainty.
a) The mechanics and availability of futures trading in coffee
The mechanism of futures trading can be illustrated using the example of a relatively
large coffee exporter. Once the exporter has bought the coffee from farmers at, say, a
price of “s”, he is open to the risk of losses if international spot prices fall to below “s” by
the time he finds a foreign buyer. Of course, if spot prices rise above “s”, the exporter
stands to gain. However, the risk of sudden changes in the value of the stocks remains.
9To reduce this risk, when the exporter buys the stock of coffee at price “s”, he can
simultaneously sell a futures contract (transacted with a bank or possibly directly at one
of the futures exchanges such as the New York Coffee, Sugar and Cocoa Exchange) to be
bought back when the coffee is physically sold to a foreign buyer. If the spot price has
fallen, say to “s1”, then the loss on his physical contract is offset by the gain on his
futures contract, since he is able to buy back the futures contract at “s1” which is lower
than the initial sale price at “s”. Of course, if spot prices rise to above “s”, say to “s2”,
then his gain on his physical contract would be offset by the loss on the futures contract,
as he has to buy the futures back at price, “s2”, which is higher than the initial sale price
of “s”. Furthermore, the analysis would not be complete until transactions costs in the
form of commissions on the futures transaction, storage charges, and interest costs are
taken into account. This example, however, illustrates how the risks associated with
fluctuations in the spot price of coffee, over a short period of time, can be managed by the
use of coffee futures.
The main exchange for coffee is the Coffee, Sugar, and Cocoa Exchange (CSCE) in New
York, which is part of the New York Board of Trade. Contracts are based on a given
quality of washed Arabica coffee produced in Central and South America, Africa, the
Middle East and Asia (Coffee “C”). Physical delivery is accepted from an approved list of
countries, with each country receiving a premium or a discount for the quality of its
coffee. For example, Columbia receives a premium of 200 points, while coffee from
Burundi, India and Rwanda is sold at a discount of 300 points. The minimum size of the
contract, 35,000 pounds, and transaction costs puts this technique outside the reach of
small producers and requires the intermediation of a cooperative or a marketing board.
The other main exchange is the London International Financial Futures and Options
Exchange (LIFFE). It trades Robusta coffee futures in US dollars and five ton units. The
coffee is available for physical delivery from a list of 24 countries that include Vietnam.
Coffee futures are also traded in Sao Paulo, Singapore, and Manila.
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(b) The mechanics and availability of options trading in coffee
Whilst futures trading eliminates any potential gains or losses to the coffee exporter
resulting from spot price fluctuations, the use of options can put a minimum price floor
under negative movements in spot prices whilst allowing the exporter to take advantage
of gains resulting from price rises. This is achieved by the exporter buying a “put option”
at the time when he contracts to buy the coffee stock from the farmers. This type of
financial contract gives the exporter the right but not the obligation to buy back the
futures contract at a given price (the “strike price”) by a given future time (the expiration
date). Unlike in the previous example, the exporter does not have to buy back the futures
contract if the spot price is above the strike price, thereby giving him protection against
price falls, but allows him the benefit of price rises. The disadvantage with options is that
the premium required is often large. Premia are calculated as a function of the short term
interest rates, the time to expiration, the volatility of the spot price, the differential
between the strike and the underlying spot price, and the probability distribution of the
expected spot price. As spot price volatility directly affects the size of the premium,
options become more expensive precisely when price volatility is high and protection is
needed the most. Options on coffee futures are available on the London, New York and
Sao Paulo exchanges.
Banks and dealers have spawned a plethora of derivative instruments (known generically
as “synthetics”) which are essentially combinations of various types of options (for a
detailed analysis, see Akiyama and Christian 2001, pp265-9). Their summary of the
benefits, costs, and risks of the various instruments is re-produced in appendix B.
(c ) The relationship between spot and futures prices in coffee
Futures prices are linked to spot prices: they are usually above spot prices, with the
difference related to stocking costs and interest rates (the “carrying costs”). Expected crop
size and quantities in storage are the other main factors influencing futures prices.
Normally, the futures price would be equal to current spot price plus the carrying costs. If
it were less, all available supplies would be sold; and if it were more, the commodity
would be entirely stored (Sharpe, 1990). However, some traders will store the commodity
even if the difference between futures and spot prices is lower then the carrying costs
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because they are speculating on the fact that the spot price will rise by more than that
difference.
In some instances, notably in 1997 for coffee, the current spot price may be above the
futures price. This denotes a shortage situation that is expected to abate with the arrival of
a future crop. In theory, such a situation is not possible as arbitrageurs would borrow the
commodity, sell it in the spot market, and buy a futures contract to return the commodity
to the lender on the settlement date. In practice, there may not be any supplies available
for this type of arbitrage if stocks are too low or traders are holding on to their stocks with
the hope the price will go up further.
 Futures prices are normally less volatile than spot prices. The reason for this is that
current situations of shortage or oversupply are usually expected to be corrected in the
future as crop size adjusts (see Figure 4).
In addition, as futures and options are expressed in US dollars, producers may need to
hedge against the exchange risk. Derivative instruments for hedging (forward contracts,
futures, and options) may not be available in the producing countries. If those countries
are pegging their currency to the US dollar, or if an appreciation of the domestic currency
against the dollar is highly unlikely, hedging may be dispensed with, but there is always
an element of risk involved in such a strategy.
Finally, there is the issue of quality premium or discount. The quality of domestic coffee
may improve or deteriorate, and growers will not supply the same quality and
consequently cannot be guaranteed the same price.
While futures exchanges can be used to hedge prices over a crop year and thus to
guarantee a minimum price to growers before the harvest, it is also possible to hedge over
a period longer than that for which futures contracts are traded by rolling over the
contracts (See appendix C). This is not a perfect hedge, however, as the price change in
the futures contracts may not offset exactly the change in the spot price (due to “basis”
risk), but large price movements, such as one due to a catastrophe wiping out a major
producer’s crop, would be reflected in all contract prices, as well as in spot prices.
12
b) Who benefits from the use of derivatives trading?
One obvious beneficiary would be the exporting and stockholding enterprises. Given
the relatively short- term nature of the hedging instruments, they would seem to be ideally
suited to the market risks faced by such companies. Furthermore, the ability to hedge
against market risks could increase the willingness of financial institutions to extend lines
of credit to such enterprises, since the hedged value of the stock would then be more
attractive as collaterals compared with unhedged stock.
As for small growers , to the extent that they are able to diversify their crops, they have a
natural hedge against commodity price fluctuations. However, with many small farmers
in developing countries (including small coffee growers in Vietnam), diversification is
difficult. Therefore, the benefits of commodity price hedging are apparent, although the
ability of small growers, on their own, to take advantage of the opportunities is highly
questionable. As a rule, they have inadequate lines of credit, insufficient know-how, and
poor legal/commercial infrastructure to engage in hedging activities. On the other hand,
there are well-known examples of institutional development (such as FEDECOOP, the
apex organization of coffee cooperatives in Costa Rica) where problems relating to access
are overcome. FEDECOOP itself uses derivative markets and is able to offer minimum
price guarantees to their members in return for a fixed fee. Also in Costa Rica, millers
make a first payment to growers on delivery of the coffee beans. The down payments are
non-refundable, and represent about half of the spot price. This constitutes a type of
minimum price guarantee for the farmers. However, a few millers are able to use
derivative trading to cover themselves against coffee price fluctuations, and are able to
offer three-quarters of the spot price as down payments, with the costs of derivative
trading deducted from the final payment to growers. In spite of the additional costs, these
millers attract more of the business, and take on the role of an intermediary in pooling the
price risks from many small growers and hedge the exposure in the derivative markets
(see Varangis and Larson 1996, Claessens and Varangis 1993).
In a simulation study of the Costa Rican coffee industry from 1983 to 1998, it was found
that, under a program of participatory options hedge, the average revenue received by the
coffee grower was less than the prevailing market prices in 38 out of 110 months in the
program period, but above the market in 72 months. Furthermore, in some months,
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producer revenue would have been significantly higher than market prices (Akiyama and
Christian 2001). The benefit to small growers is apparent. Furthermore, such a program is
also shown to be sustainable. The simulation study shows that in months in which the
difference between the revenues from the program and spot selling was positive, the
cumulative amount of revenue received in excess of market prices was $3,810 for the
whole program period. On the other hand, the cumulative loss in months in which the
difference was negative was only $545. This is in sharp contrast to price stabilization
schemes where experience has shown that the probability of running out of funds is
almost 100%.
The political necessity for governments to be involved often in financially unsustainable
farm income/price support schemes means that governments can also be a potential
beneficiary of derivatives trading in commodities. Not only can the derivatives market be
less expensive to manage and operate than traditional price support programs, it is also
seen to be more friendly towards free trade. The US Department of Agriculture and the
Agri-Food Canada have both been conducting pilot projects that use commodity
derivative based instruments to give producers of feedgrain and wheat (in the case of the
US) and live cattle (in the case of Canada) an alternative to traditional farm income
support programs. The Mexican government, on the other hand, has been using
derivatives to manage the risk exposure associated with its price protection program to
cotton growers (Varangis and Larson 1996).3 Through a government organization,
ASERCA, cotton growers are offered the chance to participate in a program that
guarantees them a minimum price in exchange for a fixed fee. In fact, ASERCA uses the
fee as a premium to purchase a put option on the exchange for delivery at harvest time. If
the spot price at harvest time falls, ASERCA exercises the option and makes a profit with
which it pays the farmers the difference between the spot and the guaranteed price. If the
spot price rises, ASERCA does not make any payments to the farmers.
Although governments or their agencies can benefit from using the derivatives market,
the aim is to encourage the private sector to take over this role in due course, at least as
far as providing a guaranteed minimum income for growers is concerned. However,
governments may want to use the derivatives market to hedge against risks to its revenues
                                                                
3 ASERCA has now been extended to cover growers of cotton, soybean, corn wheat and sorghum.
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and/or foreign exchange earnings if they are dependent on export taxes levied on a limited
number of commodities. Whilst the desirability of export taxes is a separate issue, given
that some governments choose to use them, derivatives trading can in such cases, become
an important adjunct to budget planning.
4. Implications for Vietnam
a) Recent policy on the stockpiling of coffee beans
From the discussion on buffer stocks in section 2 above, it is clear that the decision taken
in February 2001 to stockpile coffee beans was costly, had no impact in terms of raising
international prices, and benefited coffee growers only in as much as the prices paid to
buy coffee into the stockpile ware  above the prices they would otherwise have received.
In essence, therefore, it is an inefficient method of transferring taxpayers funds to
growers, or to the rest of the world to the extent that Vietnam is able to influence world
prices.  Furthermore, financing the stockpile by the state-owned Bank for Agriculture and
Rural Development increased the likelihood of more non-performing loans, thereby
complicating the task of re-structuring the state-owned banks. The decision in July to
effectively abandon the stockpiling policy was therefore justified. Vietnam should not
have undertaken such an experiment in the first place.
b) Proposal for a Coffee Board
The argument for the establishment of a coffee marketing board to improve the quality of
Vietnam’s coffee beans is unconvincing on the face of it, without  a clear delineation of
the functions of the board.  The relatively low quality of Vietnam’s coffee beans is
attributable to a number of factors including the practice of strip harvesting which mixes
the ripe and unripe cherries, inadequate primary processing, and the use of chemical
fertilizers which gives high productivity but tends to lower the quality of the cherries
(Dang Kim Son, Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development, Hanoi). Furthermore,
Vietnam’s coffee beans fetch lower than world market prices because of poor sorting
techniques and a lack of adherence to international standards of grading coffee. As a
result, it has been the practice to market Vietnam’s coffee based on individual contracts
(which tend to result in lower prices for the producers) rather than selling the coffee based
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on international prices quoted for specific grades (Anh 1999). The state monopoly over
coffee exports prior to 1999 was also responsible for lowering Vietnam’s reputation in the
international marketplace as the SOEs in charge of coffee exports had, from time to time,
neglected to fulfil their side of the contract. Therefore, without further clarification on the
functioning of this board, it is difficult to see how another government- owned
exporter/marketing board is able to improve quality and fetch higher prices for Vietnam’s
coffee beans.
As discussed in section 2 above, many of the information collection and marketing
functions of a coffee board can now be substituted by technology accessible to exporters
in the private sector. This is much more cost effective than operating a formal coffee
board. If agricultural extension services were needed, perhaps the formation of a growers’
co-operative along the lines of FEDECOOP in Costa Rica might be more appropriate. As
discussed above, FEDECOOP also provides the very important service of pooling the
price risks of small coffee growers and accessing the market for derivatives trading in
order to transfer those risks to international players better able to bear them. A
government -sponsored organization such as the ASERCA for Mexican cotton growers
can also provide a minimum price guarantee in return for a fixed fee, and then hedge its
own exposure in derivative markets. In addition, ASERCA provides services for
agricultural commercialization.
c) Coffee price hedging for Vietnam?
Given both the theoretical and empirical arguments against price stabilization schemes,
particularly commodity buffer stocks, it is wise for Vietnam to cease experimenting with
them. Instead, schemes that can guarantee growers a minimum price at a fixed fee, and
then have the exposure hedged in derivative markets should be considered. It is obvious
that small coffee growers lack the credit and the know how to access this market.
Therefore, an organization along the lines of ASERCA in Mexico could be instituted.
Given the current lack of private brokers, a government -sponsored organization might be
more appropriate to Vietnam’s current stage of development. Alternatively, a growers’
co-operative such as the FEDECOOP in Costa Rica could also be set up. Again, given the
relatively low levels of private sector development at the moment, perhaps a producers
co-operative with some form of government sponsorship might be appropriate. In time,
16
however, as the domestic banking sector develops, private banks and exporters would be
the natural candidates to carry out such financial intermediation services.
A key requirement is that such an organization be staffed with professionals skilled in
managing derivatives trading on the one hand, and extension services workers who have
the confidence of the small growers on the other. A Coffee Board could conceivably take
on these tasks, but such a board would be performing roles very different to those in
traditional state -owned marketing boards.
For such an organization to have the confidence of the growers, it would seem that the
cartel of state exporters/processors/licensed assemblers needs to be eliminated. Current
market developments are not completely clear, but the growth of private exporters (to the
extent of absorbing 30 to 40%) of total coffee exports, must be having a strong negative
impact on the cartel. Abolition of licensing requirements for assemblers (in line generally
with the implementation of the Enterprises Law) would also go a long way towards
eliminating the cartel.
In order to access international financial markets for hedging, the organization would
need to be exempted from certain elements of exchange control regulations. Furthermore,
as the US dollar peg cannot be relied upon to hold, particularly as coffee export prices
tumble and remain low very extended periods of time, any US dollar exposures would
also need to be hedged in the international financial markets.
An important obstacle to accessing the international financial markets is sovereign risk of
governments and their agencies in developing countries. In this regard, the World Bank
could perhaps establish a facility whereby it guarantees performance on any payment or
loan provisions in a hedging instrument. Enabling small coffee farmers to access hedging
facilities (albeit indirectly through a government organization) could arguably be part of a
poverty reduction program of the Bank.
Before embarking on coffee price hedging, there will need to be an intensive educational
program for policy makers on the benefits of such a course of action, as well as a
thorough training exercise in derivatives trading. Neither of these can be effectively done
via the class room only. Open and free policy dialogue with countries that already have
those schemes in place would be important, as is on-the-ground training for traders in
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commodity derivatives. Again, the assistance of the World Bank and other international
financial institutions would be highly desirable. Not only could this involvement by the
World Bank be seen as part of the poverty reduction program but, to the extent that
government policy on a coffee buffer stock and hence financing from the Bank for
Agriculture and Rural Development be wound back, this initiative would also enhance the
current World Bank program on state commercial bank re-structuring.
Conclusions
It is clear from the above discussions that domestic buffer stocks cannot raise world
prices in a particular commodity except in the very rare cases where a country has
monopoly power in the world market. Even then, domestic buffer stock schemes allow
other producers to “free ride” on the higher prices. It was wise therefore that Vietnam
abandoned  its experimentation with buffer stocks. If income support is needed for the
small growers during this period of low world prices, then more direct methods of relief
should be considered.
Furthermore, in line with the operation of the Enterprises Law, the exclusive licensing of
coffee assemblers by the SOEs should be abolished (if this has not yet happened). Unless
there are sound reasons for licensing assemblers (for instance, on the grounds of special
qualifications and/or experience), then the field ought to be left open to free entry.
Competition amongst assemblers could, over time, be expected to result in a higher share
of the export prices paid to the small growers. In addition, the risks of price fluctuations
could also be expected to pass from the small growers to the processors and exporters
who are better able to hedge these risks in the international financial market.
Finally, a training program in commodity risk management should be developed with the
Task Force specializing in this area in the World Bank. At the same time, a government-
sponsored growers’ co-operative, association, or board should be set up, ready to employ
the trained staff in coffee price hedging in the international market. The performance of
such an organization should be monitored regularly, and there should be a clear
timeframe for passing the ownership of such an organization from the public to private
hands.
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Figure 1b: Robusta coffee prices (London market)
0
50
100
150
200
250
19
70
19
71
19
72
19
73
19
74
19
75
19
76
19
77
19
78
19
79
19
80
19
81
19
82
19
83
19
84
19
85
19
86
19
87
19
88
19
89
19
90
19
91
19
92
19
93
19
94
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
Years
P
ri
ce
s 
(U
S
 C
en
t/P
o
u
n
d
)
Figure 1a: Coffee prices (New York market)
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Figure 2: Coffee Marketing system in Vietnam as at end - 1998
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Figure 3: Coffee marketing system in Vietnam since 1999
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Figure 4: Future and spot prices for Coffee (New York market)
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Appendix A
Box 1. The Australian Wool Board/Corporation
Between 1974 and 1991, the Australian Wool Board, and its successor, the
Australian Wool Corporation (AWC) operated a “Reserve Price Scheme”
(RPS), equivalent to a buffer stock with a guaranteed minimum price for
Australian wool producers. The scheme was financed by a tax on growers, but
the AWC was allowed to borrow to finance stockpiling. A similar scheme had
operated during the second World War: by mid-1945, large stocks of wool,
equivalent to two years of consumption, had been accumulated, but strong
demand in the immediate post-war period facilitated the disposal of stocks and
substantial profits were distributed to growers (Boyd, 1982).
For the first 12 years, the RPS was not challenged, thanks to stable demand for
wool et reduced production associated with good prices for cereals (Watson,
1990). However, a 70% increase in the reserve price over 2 years led to a rapid
accumulation of stocks. The scheme was disbanded in 1991, leaving a large
stockpile to be disposed of and around A$ 2.5 billion of accumulated debt.
The wool industry no longer operates a marketing board. The 1999 report of the
Wool Task Force conveyed by the Commonwealth Minister for Agriculture,
Fisheries and Forestry (The Wool Taskforce, 1999) stated:
“In case there is any doubt on the matter, the Task Force wishes to be
absolutely clear: under no circumstances should any form of RPS for wool ever
be reintroduced in Australia. There should be no institution in place which has
the capacity to make such a catastrophic mistake affecting every wool business
in the country.”
The Task Force even recommended that the successor of the Australian Wool
Corporation, the Australian Wool Exchange Limited (AWEX), whose mission is
“to provide and facilitate efficient, innovative and informed trading systems in
an environment that fosters competition and self-regulation”(AWEX, 2001), be
disbanded. This has not happened: AWEX continues to play a role in the trading
of wool, and the development and implementation of standards for quality and
for accreditation of wool classers.
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Appendix B
Instruments Characteristics Transaction Costs Risks
Spot Sales or
Purchases
Completely unhedged Fees and imbedded in
quoted price
Totally exposed to market prices
Forwards Locks in specific purchase
or sale price
Fees and imbedded in
quoted price
Lose all exposure to beneficial
price developments. Can have
large credit exposure if market
prices move in favour of the user
Future Locks in specific purchase
or sale price
Brokers commissions
and margin
requirements
Lose all exposure to beneficial
price developments. Can have
large credit exposure if market
prices move in favour of user
Options Protect against negative
price developments; retain
exposure to beneficial price
development
Pay premiums which
can be expensive
Lose premium
Collars Protect against negative
price developments; gain
minimum exposure to
beneficial price
developments
No fees or
commissions. Fees are
imbedded in quoted
price
Lose most exposure to beneficial
price developments. Large credit
exposure can develop if market
moves in user's favour, due to
potential costs of delivering
against the position
Synthetic Puts Protect against negative
price developments
Pay premiums, which
can be expensive
Lose small portion of beneficial
price developments
Participatory
Options
Programs
Protect against negative
price developments and
retains exposure to
beneficial price development
No fees or
commissions
Lose small portion of beneficial
price developments
Swaps Like forwards, locks in
specific purchase or sale
price
No fees or
commissions. Fees are
imbedded in quoted
prices
Lose all exposure to beneficial
price developments. Can have
large credit exposure if market
prices move in favour of the user
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Appendix C
Table 1 shows how such a strategy (called a “stack”) would have worked between 1998
and 2001 for coffee traded on the CSCE. It assumes that on each settlement date the
fourth furthest contract (for settlement 12 months hence) is sold and then bought back on
the next settlement date, (at the price of what is now the third furthest contract), when the
new fourth furthest contract is sold. These 2 contracts were chosen because their liquidity
is greater than for the fifth furthest contract and they provide an initial longer hedge than
the nearby contract.
Table 1
A Coffee “Stack” 1998-2001
Dates Nearby
contract
2nd furthest
contract
3rd furthest
contract
4th furthest
contract
5th furthest
contract
15/6/98 120 120 120 120 120
15/9/98 111 105 103 104 104
15/12/98 120 121 121 121 121
15/3/99 103 103 105 106 108
15/6/99 104 106 107 109 111
15/9/99 81 85 87 89 91
15/12/99 126 128 131 133 135
15/3/00 103 103 106 109 112
15/6/00 88 91 96 100 103
15/9/00 76 81 86 89 91
15/12/00 63 67 70 73 76
15/3/01 59 61 64 67 70
Source: CSCE, New York
On June 15, 1998, one sells the fourth furthest contract for $120. On September 15, the
contract is bought back at $103), the price of the third furthest contract, for a gain of $17
per contract, and the new fourth furthest contract is sold at $104, etc… Adding up the
profits and losses on each futures transaction results in a net profit that offsets the large
decline in coffee prices over the period. Transaction costs, however, would reduce the net
profit, especially for relatively small quantities. This type of hedging is only feasible for
large producers or exporters, or groupings of smaller ones.
25
REFERENCES
Akiyama, T. and Christian. J., (forthcoming). 'Effective Risk Management Strategies:
Cases of Hedging by Governments, Firms and Smallholders'. World Bank.
Boyd, A.W., 1969.  The Grower and Marketing Organization of the Wool Industry since
1945, Queensland Department of Primary Industries.
Che, N. T. Kompas, T. and Vousden. N., (forthcoming). 'Incentives and Static and
Dynamic Gains from Market Reform in an Emerging Profits Model' in Australian
Journal of Agriculture Economics.
Claessens, S. and Varangis. P., 1993. 'Implementing Risk Mangement Strategies in Costa
Rica's Coffee Sector' in Claessens and Duncan (eds) Managing Commodity Price
Risk in Developing Countries. Pp 185 - 230.
Commonwealth of Australia., 1999. Diversity and Innovation for Australian Wool, Report
of the Wool Industry Future Directions Task Force.
COMMRISK.NET., 2000-01. The Internet site of the International Task Force on
Commodity Risk Management in Developing Countries.
Dang Kim Son., 22 March 2001. Email Correspondence
Deaton, A. and Laroque. G., 1992. 'On the behaviour of Commodity Prices' in Review of
Economic Studies. Vol 59, pp 1 - 23.
Dow Jones Newswires., 20 March 2001. 'Vietnam Agriculture Bank Lent VND 1.7
Trillion For Coffee Retention Plan'.
Gilbert (1999), C. L., 1999. 'Commodity Risk Management, Market Libralisation and the
Costs of Price Variability for Developing Country Farmers'. Vrije Universitiet,
Amsterdam, draft.
Independent Commission of Experts., 1980. 'Brandt Report'.
Leung, S. and Riedel. J., 2001. 'The Role of the State in Vietnam's Economic Transition' -
in "Proceedings of the Conference on 'Achieving High Growth: Experience of
Transitional Economies in East Asia' ".
Minot, N., 1998. Vietnam Competitiveness of Processing Sector in UNDP-DSI report.
Nguyen Anh Tu., 1999. 'The Export of Agricultural Commodities in Developing
Countries - the Case of Vietnam's Coffee Industry in Period 1986 - 1998' - Master
Thesis. National Economics University.
Nguyen Thien Nhan - Chairman of VICOFA., 7 April 2001. (private interview)
26
Reuter News Service., 12 March 2001. 'Hanoi Reschedules Media Trip to Troubled
Highlands'.
Sharpe, W. F.,1990. Investments, Prentice Hall.
UNCTAD., 1994. Risk Distribution after Liberalization of Commodity Marketing
and Problems of Access to Risk Management Markets for Developing Country
Entities- Illustrated by the Example of Coffee in Africa.
UNCTAD., 1976. 'The Integrated Programme for Commodities: Resolusion 93 (IV)'.
Varangis, P. and Larson. D ., 1996. 'Dealing with Commodity Price Uncertainty' in Policy
Research Working Paper No. 1667, the World Bank.
Watson, A., 1990.  Unravelling Intervention in the Wool Industry, Center for Independent
Studies.
